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Abstract Neural networks (NN) learn complex non-convex functions, making
them desirable solutions in many contexts. Applying NNs to safety-critical tasks
demands formal guarantees about their behavior. Recently, a myriad of verifica-
tion solutions for NNs emerged using reachability, optimization, and search based
techniques. Particularly interesting are adversarial examples, which reveal ways the
network can fail. They are widely generated using incomplete methods, such as
local optimization, which cannot guarantee optimality. We propose strategies to ex-
tend existing verifiers to provide provably optimal adversarial examples. Naive ap-
proaches combine bisection search with an off-the-shelf verifier, resulting in many
expensive calls to the verifier. Instead, our proposed approach yields tightly in-
tegrated optimizers, achieving better runtime performance. We extend Marabou,
an SMT-based verifier, and compare it with the bisection based approach and
MIPVerify, an optimization based verifier.
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1 Introduction
Artificial deep neural networks (DNNs) have shown great promise in a wide va-
riety of applications (Schmidhuber, 2015; Liu et al., 2017). These applications
include image recognition (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), control (Hunt et al., 1992),
and natural language processing (Otter et al., 2020). There is now even a trend
of incorporating DNNs into safety-critical systems (Bojarski et al., 2016; Julian
et al., 2016). Although DNNs are obtaining unprecedented results, their opacity
poses significant challenges — especially in the context of safety-critical systems,
where mistakes can endanger lives and cause significant damage. A notable exam-
ple includes DNNs in autonomous driving systems, where unexpected behavior of
the DNN could harm passengers or pedestrians. Consequently, it is especially de-
sirable to formally reason about DNNs, providing rigorous guarantees about their
behaviors.
In order to address this issue, a great deal of research in recent years has
focused on neural network verification (Huang et al., 2017; Katz et al., 2017; Gehr
et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018b). Verification techniques are sound approaches
for answering yes or no questions about DNNs and can be used in ruling out
undesirable behaviors. For example, a verification query for an autonomous driving
DNN could ask if an input exists in which the autonomous vehicle is approaching
an obstacle but the DNN advises the vehicle to maintain the current course. If the
verification engine answers no, we are guaranteed that this particular behavior can
never happen for any possible input. If it answers yes, then it returns an input which
leads to the errant behavior. The verification problem has been shown to be NP-
complete (Katz et al., 2017), and so the main limitation to verification technology
is its scalability; however, large strides have been made in recent years (Wang
et al., 2018a; Weng et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2019; Tran et al., 2020b; Wu et al.,
2020).
Although great efforts have been put into answering yes or no questions with
DNNs, formally answering quantitative questions about them has received less
attention. In order to verify a system, we want to ask questions like how close
an obstacle can be before the DNN controller turns the vehicle or how much
the steering of the car can be affected by small errors in the input image from
a camera used to control it. Finding an exact answer to these questions can be
achieved through global optimization and will allow us to provide a guarantee
about behavior. Global optimization of neural networks can also be used in the
context of interpreting the patterns that a network has learned. The activation of
a hidden node can be maximized or minimized with respect to the input to give a
sense of what the node is recognizing in the input space. This has been done with
local optimizers but to our knowledge has not been explored with global optimizers
(Le, 2013; Ribeiro et al., 2016).
Approximate techniques for answering these questions use heuristics and lo-
cal optimization to find inputs that lead to undesired behavior from the network.
Such techniques are referred to as adversarial attacks, and the corresponding in-
puts that lead to the undesired behavior are known as adversarial examples. Many
techniques have been proposed, both for performing such attacks and defending
against them (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Chakraborty
et al., 2018; Yuan et al., 2019). However, these approaches still only provide an
approximate answer to the question. Existing strategies to solve global optimiza-
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tion problems on neural networks have included performing a binary search for
the optimal value by repeatedly calling neural verifiers, as well as mixed integer
programming (MIP) approaches that explicitly encode the network as constraints
in an optimization problem. Repeatedly calling a neural verifier is often computa-
tionally prohibitive, while MIP approaches work well on some problem types but
struggle with others (Carlini et al., 2017; Tjeng et al., 2017). It is desirable to have
more approaches that can better accommodate different problem domains.
In order to have a wider variety of approaches for neural optimization, we intro-
duce a framework for converting existing verifiers into optimizers. We demonstrate
our framework by extending the Marabou verifier, which implements the Reluplex
algorithm (Katz et al., 2019). Our extended version of Marabou, which we refer to
as MarabouOpt, performs a branch and bound search over the activation space of
the network. We compare the runtime of our solver to MIPVerify, a MIP approach
that also solves global optimization problems, and find that the two approaches
are complementary to each other on the benchmarks tested. Additionally, we com-
pare the approximate optima found by adversarial attack algorithms to the true
optima found by MarabouOpt.
This paper has the following structure: section 2 provides background and
descriptions of the notation used in the rest of the paper; section 3 describes high-
level approaches for modifying four categories of verifiers to perform optimization;
section 4 describes in detail how the Reluplex algorithm can be modified to per-
form optimization; section 5 presents our experimental setup and results; section 6
summarizes related work; and section 7 concludes and suggests future research di-
rections.
2 Background and Problem Formulation
This section introduces notation and defines the neural network verification and
neural network optimization problems. It also provides a categorization of neural
network verification algorithms and explains existing local optimizers.
Neural Networks. We denote the function represented by a neural network N
with n inputs and m outputs as f(x) : Rn → Rm. Let a network N with K lay-
ers, including the input and output layers, have input to layer ` denoted by zˆ`
and output of layer ` denoted by z`. The input to each layer (besides the first)
is computed by applying an affine transformation to the previous layer followed
by an activation function. We consider two activation functions in this paper: the
identity function and the rectified linear unit (ReLU). For a rectified linear unit
(ReLU) layer `, we have
z` = max(0, zˆ`). (1)
For identity layers, we have
z` = zˆ`. (2)
Let W` and b` be the weights and biases connecting layer ` to layer ` + 1 such
that
zˆ`+1 = W`z` + b`. (3)
The output of the network will be referred to as y, with
y = zK . (4)
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Let L denote the set of indices of ReLU layers and I denote the set of indices
of identity layers. A ReLU is considered active if its input is greater than or equal
to 0, and inactive otherwise. An activation state is a representation of whether a
node is active or not for each ReLU in a network. For a given activation state,
let A be the set of indices (i, j) of active ReLUs where i is the layer and j is the
node in the layer. Similarly, let N be the set of indices (i, j) of inactive ReLUs. A
partial activation state is an activation state where some nodes are left unknown.
In this case, let U be the set of indices (i, j) of undetermined nodes for the partial
activation state.
Geometric Objects. We refer to sets described by the intersection of affine
inequalities as polytopes. A polytope P can be described by a matrix A and vector
b as P = {x : Ax ≤ b}. We refer to the complement of a polytope as a polytope
complement. Polytope complements can be used to represent non-convex and un-
bounded spaces. Hyperrectangles are convex polytopes that can be described by
an upper and lower bound on each variable. The radius of a hyperrectangle is a
vector r containing values equal to half the interval between the upper and lower
bound for each dimension. We assume that the domain of f given by domf is a
hyperrectangle, although this domain is not included in the formulations presented
here. Hypercubes are hyperrectangles with a uniform radius. Let
X ⊆ Rn Y ⊆ Rm (5)
be input and output sets which we will use in our problem definitions.
Neural Verification Problem. One approach to verifying a network is to show
that an input-output property holds. Such a property can be specified as
x ∈ X =⇒ y = f(x) ∈ Y (6)
We will refer to any algorithm that solves verification problems as a verifier. Dif-
ferent verifiers can handle different types of input and output sets. There are
approaches to verification that are sound, complete, or both. If a sound algorithm
reports that a property holds, then it must actually hold. If a complete algorithm
reports that a property is violated, then it must actually be violated. An algorithm
that is both sound and complete must always give a correct answer if it terminates.
2.1 Approaches to Verification
In this section, we present several categories of verification algorithms described
by Liu et al. (2019). Each approach can be extended to perform optimization
as described in section 3. There are four categories: reachability, optimization,
search with reachability, and search with optimization. Although we focus on
sound and complete verifiers, there are many interesting incomplete verifiers in
these categories as well.
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Reachability
Complete reachability methods compute an exact output reachable set, then use
this reachable set to solve verification problems. The reachable set is found by
propagating the input set through the network layer by layer. Once an exact
output reachable set is found, the verification problem can be solved by checking
whether the reachable set is contained within the set Y. If the input set is a
polytope or union of polytopes, then the reachable set will also be a union of
polytopes (Xiang et al., 2017). In this case, the test for inclusion requires solving
several linear programs (LPs). If the exact reachable set is contained within the
output set Y, the property holds. If it is not, then the property does not hold.
ExactReach is a reachability method which propagates polytopes through the
network (Xiang et al., 2017). The more recent NNV uses a different way of rep-
resenting polytopes, star sets, to greatly improve the efficiency of the propagation
(Tran et al., 2020a).
Optimization
Optimization methods encode the network and property as a constrained optimiza-
tion problem. They typically constrain the input to be in X and the output to be
in Y{, representing the region outside of the output region of the property (Liu
et al., 2019; Lomuscio and Maganti, 2017). If the resulting optimization problem
is feasible, then we know some input in the input space X can reach outside of the
output space Y, and the property must not hold. Conversely, if the optimization
problem is infeasible then there must be no input in X that reaches outside of the
output set and the property holds.
NSVerify is an optimization method which uses a mixed integer encoding for
the network and linear input and output constraints (Lomuscio and Maganti,
2017). MIPVerify is another optimization method which improves on NSVerify in
two ways. It adopts a tighter encoding of the ReLU and it performs a progressive
bound tightening process. MIPVerify has been used to solve both output and
minimum adversarial perturbation optimization problems described in section 2.3.
Search
Search with reachability and search with optimization methods search for a counter-
example to the property by breaking the problem into a series of subproblems. The
search space commonly consists of input ranges or neuron activations (Katz et al.,
2017; Wang et al., 2018a,c; Liu et al., 2019; Botoeva et al., 2020). The search ends
immediately if it finds an input that violates the property. If a region is proven to
satisfy the property, the search proceeds to the next region. If neither conclusion
is reached, the region is broken down further. At each step, a reachability or opti-
mization approach is taken to determine whether the property in the region holds
or is violated.
Neurify is an example of a search with reachability algorithm. It performs a
type of symbolic reachability analysis called symbolic linear relaxation to find an
approximate reachable set and reason about the property for a given region (Wang
et al., 2018a). Reluplex is an example of a search with optimization algorithm which
searches the activation space, solving a constrained linear program at each step to
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reason about the region (Katz et al., 2017). An extension of the Reluplex algorithm
to perform optimization is described in more detail in section 2.2.
2.2 The Reluplex Algorithm
The Reluplex algorithm searches for a counter-example to the property, i.e. an
input x ∈ X such that the output y ∈ Y{. The Reluplex algorithm explores the
activation space by fixing ReLUs to be either inactive or active, one at a time. The
search space is a binary tree, where each node represents a set of fixed ReLUs,
which is equivalent to a partial activation state. Each edge leaving a node repre-
sents another ReLU becoming fixed to be active or inactive respectively. At each
node, a relaxed linear feasibility problem is solved using the simplex algorithm.
If a satisfying assignment is obtained, it is checked against the remaining non-
linear constraints. If the obtained assignment satisfies the non-linear constraints,
a counterexample has been found and the search stops. However, if the assignment
violates some non-linear constraints, then Reluplex can either fix the assignment
and continue solving the linear relaxation, or perform a case split. A case split
fixes the phase of a single ReLU and adds its — now linear — constraints to the
relaxation, simplifying the problem. Reluplex judiciously explores and trims the
search space until it either finds a satisfying assignment or proves that one does
not exist.
Note the similar pattern of search in Reluplex and Neurify — both decompose
the problem into smaller problems and then solve each independent feasibility
problem. This search structure enables these algorithms to perform optimization,
as we will show in section 3.
2.3 Neural Optimization Problem
Neural verification problems allow us to answer yes or no questions about prop-
erties of the network. However, we would like to be able to answer qualitative
questions. To that end, we define an output optimization problem and a minimum
adversarial perturbation problem. The first consists of optimization on the output
of the network subject to constraints on the input. The second consists of opti-
mization on the input of the network subject to constraints on the output. Both
can be used to answer questions that provide insight into the robustness of a sys-
tem. The first problem can be used to ask questions like, “If there is at most 5%
error in each pixel in an image used to control the steering wheel of a car, how
drastically could the wheel mistakenly be turned?” The second problem can be
used to ask questions like, “What is the smallest perturbation to my input image
which would lead to me misclassifying a person as a stop sign?” For our problems,
we will consider input and output constraints given by polytopes. These can each
be represented with a set of linear inequalities.
1. Output Optimization Problem: We would like to find the maximum of a
linear function of the output given constraints on the input. Let our objective
be g(x) = c>f(x), described by the user-defined parameter c ∈ Rm. More
complex non-linear objectives can be approximated by augmenting the network
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with extra layers. For example, for a single output network with output y, if
we wanted to maximize y2 we could add on layers which approximate the
function f(y) = y2 and then perform verification on this augmented network.
The problem formulation is
maximize
x
c>f(x)
subject to x ∈ X
(7)
with corresponding optimal value p∗ and optimizing input x∗.
2. Minimum Adversarial Perturbation Problem: We would like to find the
minimum adversarial perturbation to some original input x0 that causes un-
desired behavior. What it means to be a small perturbation can differ between
applications and algorithms, with typical distance metrics including the L1, L2,
and L∞ norms (Carlini et al., 2017; Tjeng et al., 2017). Typically, algorithms
search for the smallest possible perturbation that causes a mistake (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Yuan et al., 2019). In our case, we will
focus on the L∞ norm for simplicity. The L1 norm is also commonly used,
as it can also be represented with linear constraints (Tjeng et al., 2017). A
perturbed input x is considered adversarial if it is in some output set Y which
can be used to represent undesired behavior. Our problem is then
minimize
x
‖x− x0‖∞
subject to f(x) ∈ Y
(8)
with corresponding optimal value p∗ and optimal input x∗.
These two general problems can be used to represent the two approaches for limit-
ing the size of the perturbation and requiring adversarial behavior in the taxonomy
of adversarial examples given by Yuan et al. (2019). Adversarial examples must
be close to a nominal input and lead to undesirable behavior. The first problem
can achieve this “closeness” by constraining the input set, and the undesirable
behavior through the linear objective, while the second can achieve “closeness” by
optimizing the size of the perturbation and the undesirable behavior through the
output constraints.
2.4 Approximate Methods for Optimization
There are a variety of approximate approaches for solving neural optimization
problems. We highlight several that we use to compare to MarabouOpt. Approxi-
mate methods provide bounds on the optima for these problems.
Many adversarial attacks provide approximate solutions to one or the other of
our optimization problems (Yuan et al., 2019). The Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) provide approximate solutions
to the output optimization problem by making use of the gradient of the objective
with respect to the input (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017). FGSM
takes a single step in the direction of the gradient to the boundaries of the input
set, while PGD takes many gradient steps, projecting into the input set after each
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step. LBFGS, a quasi-Newtonian optimization method (Zhu et al., 1997), can also
be used to find an approximate solution to the output optimization problem. We
compare MarabouOpt on these problems to these three methods.
3 Strategies for Converting Verifiers into Optimizers
The main observation of this paper is that many existing approaches to neural
network verification can be extended to solve optimization problems. To substan-
tiate our claim, we illustrate strategies for four major categories of verification
algorithms outlined in the survey of verification methods (Liu et al., 2019). As
summarized in section 2.1, these categories are reachability, optimization, search
with reachability, and search with optimization. Each of these categories poses
different advantages and challenges when being extended to support optimization.
Optimization-based approaches are easily extended to handle both output and
minimum adversarial input problems, while reachability-based methods can only
be extended to support output optimization problems. Search-based approaches
break down the problem, leveraging knowledge from an explored search space to
prune the remaining search space and speed up the solving process. We describe
how to modify algorithms in each of these categories, and as a proof of concept,
we showcase the extension of Marabou, a state-of-the-art search and optimization
verifier (Katz et al., 2019), and evaluate the performance of the resulting opti-
mizer. We chose to extend Marabou because, as an optimization method, it could
be extended to both types of problems. By incorporating search, we hoped it would
scale well to challenging problems.
First, however, we present how to solve optimization problems by combining a
decision procedure with bisection search. This is a well-established approach that
serves as a baseline for comparison with the integrated approaches that we propose.
While our focus is on complete verification procedures, we discuss extensions of
incomplete approaches in section 7. Throughout the section we consider a network
N represented by function f with n inputs, m outputs, and K layers.
3.1 Optimization using Bisection Search
A complete verifier answers yes or no to the question: “Does x ∈ X imply y ∈ Y?”
An optimization problem seeking to maximize some function g(x) subject to either
x ∈ X or y ∈ Y can be solved by asking a series of yes/no questions where a
verification problem is constructed to represent the question, “can the optimal
value p∗ be greater than d” for some value d. If we start with inital bounds on p∗,
` ≤ p∗ ≤ u, we can then select d to perform bisection and update the bounds on
the optimal value, halving the remaining search space with each step. If the answer
to a query is yes, the lower bound ` is strengthened, otherwise the upper bound u
is weakened. This procedure finds the optimal solution when ` = u; alternatively,
it can be made to halt when a user-defined minimum optimality gap is achieved.
This approach has been used to find optimal solutions (Julian et al., 2020; Carlini
et al., 2017) and often relies on bracketing techniques (Kochenderfer and Wheeler,
2019) to narrow in on the optimal solution. Meta strategies can be applied to
further speed up the convergence, like solving multiple instances in parallel, and
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splitting the region into sets of disjoint intervals, rather than two halves (Julian
et al., 2020). This algorithm always terminates if the bounds are represented with
floating point numbers but may not terminate if they are represented with real
numbers.
3.2 Reachability
Reachability methods operate on sets of points rather than individual points in
order to compute an exact output reachable set for a network. Sets of points are
represented using abstract domains, such as polytopes or star sets, with efficient
operations to propagate these domains through the layers of the network. The
verification property is of the form x ∈ X =⇒ y ∈ Y, where X is the input and
Y the output set. Reachability methods propagate abstract representations of the
input set X through the network layers, until a reachable setR for the output layer
is computed. The property holds if R ⊆ Y. To reason soundly about the output
set, the abstract domain needs to be either: 1. exact — no values are lost or added
during the computation, or 2. an over-approximation — no values are lost during
the computation. In case of over-approximations, the subset check may fail even
though the property holds. Over-approximated output reachable sets can still be
used in complete methods when incorporating search in the process. The remainder
of this section focuses on methods using exact representation. ExactReach (Xiang
et al., 2017) and NNV (Xiang et al., 2017; Tran et al., 2020a) represent reachable
sets using a union of convex sets — polytopes and star sets, respectively. A star set
is a polytope encoding that supports efficient computation of propagation through
a network.
The reachable set can be represented as
R =
k⋃
i=1
Pi, (9)
where Pi are convex sets for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Therefore, there are two equivalent
reachability problems to check whether the property holds:
(x ∈ X =⇒ y ∈ Y) ⇐⇒ (R ⊆ Y) ⇐⇒ (Pi ⊆ Y, i = 1, . . . , k) (10)
Checking whether R ⊆ Y is challenging because R may be non-convex. However,
we can check whether a convex set Pi is contained within the polytope Y in
polynomial time. The polytope subset problem P ⊆ P ′, where P, P ′ are polytopes
and P ′ consists of j linear constraints, is answered by solving j linear programs
(LPs). Suppose Y consists of ` linear constraints, then solving a total of k · ` LPs
answers the verification problem in polynomial time.1
Given the basic overview of reachability techniques, how do we solve an output
optimization problem using the exact reachable set R? Let c>y with c ∈ Rm be
1 Solving each LP takes polynomial time, but note that k may be exponentially large com-
pared to the input representation. This exponential growth in the number of output sets is a
challenge for both reachability verifiers and optimizers.
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the objective function. The optimal value p∗ can be expressed in several ways:
p∗ = max
x∈X
c>f(x) (11)
= max
y∈R
c>y (12)
= max
i∈{1,2,...,k}
max
y∈Pi
c>y (13)
There are two ways to answer the optimizing query using reachability: 1. using
the non-convex set R as shown in equation (12), or 2. using the set of convex
sets Pi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} as shown in equation (13). In the latter case, the inner
maximization of the final expression maxy∈Pi c
>y has a linear objective and linear
constraints, so it is an LP. Consequently, solving an LP for each index i yields an
exact value of p∗.
Note that, whereas solving the subset problem uses ` LPs per polytope, a single
LP per polytope Pi is sufficient to find the optimal value. The maximum of the
local maxima for each Pi yields the global optimum. Given the reduction in the
number of LP problems solved, there are likely to be cases where the optimization
problem is more efficient than the verification problem with the same input set.
Understanding when this is the case is an interesting area for future investigation.
We also expect this approach to outperform the bisection approach, as the latter
requires many more calls to the verifier (albeit with smaller input sets each time).
Although the approach outlined above guarantees an optimal value, it does
not provide a method to find the corresponding optimizing input. Doing so would
require tracking additional information linking input regions to the Pi polytopes.
Specific implementations of reachability approaches may or may not already track
this information.
To conclude our analysis, exact reachability-based methods can readily be ex-
tended to solve output optimization problems. This means that ExactReach and
NNV with minimal modifications could be applied to an output optimization prob-
lem; the only change required is replacing the polytope subset check with a single
optimizing LP call. However, it is not clear how to modify reachability methods
to solve minimum adversarial input problems beyond the bisection approach dis-
cussed in section 3.1. Additional investigation is needed for this direction.
3.3 Optimization
In this section, we discuss extension of optimization-based verification approaches
to solve optimization problems. This is a fairly direct modification from the theory
standpoint. Optimization approaches, such as NSVerify and MIPVerify (Lomuscio
and Maganti, 2017; Tjeng et al., 2017), exactly encode the network as a mixed
integer program (MIP). The input set X and the complement of the output set Y
are added as linear constraints to the MIP, resulting in a feasibility problem
maximize
x
0
subject to x ∈ X
y = f(x)
y ∈ Y{
(14)
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If the MIP is satisfiable, then the original property x ∈ X =⇒ y ∈ Y does
not hold. Otherwise, it holds. These optimization-based approaches are sound and
complete.
As the problem statement in equation (14) suggests, extending this formulation
to support optimization problems only requires the embedding of a goal function.
Indeed, MIPVerify uses this approach to solve these classes of problems (Tjeng
et al., 2017).
For output optimization problems, the output constraint is removed and an
objective is added to the mixed integer program, resulting in
maximize
x
c>y
subject to x ∈ X
y = f(x)
(15)
The input set and network constraints remain unchanged. This is still an MIP,
since we assume a linear output objective. Most MIP solvers readily admit MIPs
with an objective, requiring no further modification in practice.
The process is similar for encoding a minimum adversarial perturbation prob-
lem described by output set Y and original point x0. In this case, an objective
is added for the input and the input constraint is removed, while the network
and output constraints remain unchanged. Alternatively, we can also replace the
output constraint with y ∈ Y ′, where Y ′ represents a target set of adversarial
behaviors, resulting in
minimize
x
‖x− x0‖∞
subject to y = f(x)
y ∈ Y ′
(16)
As shown in this section, optimization-based verifiers need an appropriate ob-
jective added in order to solve output optimization or minimum adversarial input
problems. This approach translates directly to search with optimization solvers as
well. In practice, this requires minimal modification to the source in order to solve
a whole new class of problems.
3.4 Search
Search-based approaches break down the space into smaller regions, typically by
constraining the input or the activation space (Liu et al., 2019). Algorithm 1 gives
the pseudocode for search-based verification. At each search state, a procedure
Violated(S, P ) is invoked. This procedure takes as input a state in the search
space S and problem P and returns one of the following three outputs:
1. a status of Violated and an assignment that violates the property;
2. a status of Holds, indicating that the property holds in this region;
3. a status of Unknown, indicating that it is unknown whether the property
holds in this region.
If a violating assignment is found, the search returns the discovered solution. If
the answer is inconclusive, the search state is decomposed into multiple smaller —
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i.e. further constrained — states and the search continues. If the property holds
in a state, the search proceeds with the next unexplored state. If all states have
been explored, the search procedure determines that the property holds.
Algorithm 1 Search-based verification
1: function Check(S, P )
2: states ← [S]
3: while states is not empty
4: state ← states.dequeue();
5: status, assignment ← Violated(state, P)
6: if status = Violated
7: return Counter-example( assignment )
8: else if status = Unknown
9: states.enqueue(Split(state, P))
. If the status is Holds the search continues
10: return PropertyHolds
Algorithm 2 Search-based optimization, branch and bound
1: function Optimize(S, P )
2: states ← [S]
3: optSoFar ← None
4: x ← None
5: while states is not empty
6: state ← states.dequeue()
7: status, val, assignment ← OptimumForRegion(state, P, optSoFar)
8: if status = Unknown
9: states.enqueue(Split(state, P))
10: else if status = Optimal . val > optSoFar
11: optSoFar ← val
12: x ← val
. If the status is WorseThanOpt the search continues
13: return optSoFar, x
Algorithm 2 extends the search-based verification approach to solve optimiza-
tion problems instead. S is still a state and P is an optimization problem which
includes an objective function and constraints. The Violated procedure is re-
placed by a OptimumForRegion(state, P , optSoFar) optimizing procedure. This
can return one of the following three outputs:
1. a status of WorseThanOpt which indicates that the optimal value in this
region is less than the true optimum. The function can make use of optSoFar
to make this assertion.
2. a status of Unknown, indicating that it is unknown whether the true optimum
could be contained in this region.
3. a status of Optimal, an objective value guaranteed to be the optimum in this
region, and an assignment which achieves this objective value. This indicates
that it has found a true global optimum.
In order to be terminating it also must be guaranteed to find the optimal, and not
return Unknown, once the region has been split enough times. One example of an
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implementation of OptimumForRegion(state, P , optSoFar) would be to solve a
relatively tractable relaxed problem, providing an upper bound on the solution. If
this upper bound is less than optSoFar, it can return WorseThanOpt since the
upper bound being lower than an objective value that has already been achieved
will guarantee the region cannot achieve the optimum. If the assignment from
solving the relaxed problem achieves the upper bound, it can return the objective
value and assignment along with a status of Optimal. Otherwise, it can return
Unknown. The way that the problem is relaxed and the upper bound is computed
differs between search with reachability and search with optimization strategies.
Search with reachability verification methods will typically use approximate
reachability methods in place of Violated (Wang et al., 2018c,a). To convert these
verifiers into optimizers, their Violated procedure can be modiified to implement
OptimumForRegion in a similar way to the extension of pure reachability-based
methods covered in section 3.2. This could be applied to extend verifiers such as
Neurify and ReluVal, which compute an approximate reachable set at each step
(Wang et al., 2018a,c). Similarly, search with optimization methods use constrained
optimization problems to implement Violated (Katz et al., 2017; Botoeva et al.,
2020), which naturally extend to optimization as discussed in section 3.3. In our
extension of Reluplex we take this approach, solving a relaxed problem that can
provide an upper bound on the true optimal value for a partial activation state
(Katz et al., 2017). This is described in more detail in section 4.
In practice, the search structure largely remains the same as verification, with
the exception that finding a counter-example does not end the search. Instead,
such intermediate values are used to facilitate the branch-and-bound strategy.
4 Extending Reluplex to Solve Optimization Problems
Reluplex is a search with optimization technique. As such, we can make use of
the strategy presented in section 3.4 to convert Reluplex from a verifier into an
optimizer. First, we define the Split(S, P ) and Violated(S, P ) functions used
in the original Reluplex, then we will discuss how to convert the Violated(S, P )
function into a corresponding OptimumForRegion(S, P , optSoFar) function.
In order to solve a verification problem with a search with optimization tech-
nique, we need to define two functions: Split(S, P ) and Violated(S, P ). The
Split function is meant to take a state and break it down into two (or more) states
which will be easier to solve. This guides the search process. Reluplex searches over
the activation states of the network. It does this in an incremental fashion, starting
at a state where no ReLUs are fixed and then proceeding to fix ReLUs one by one
during the search. Here, the state S will be a partial activation state. The imple-
mentation of Split will choose a node (i, j) that is undetermined in the current
state and return two new states: the first state will be the current state with the
additional node (i, j) fixed to be active, and the second state will be the same ex-
cept with node (i, j) fixed to be inactive. There are a variety of possible strategies
to pick this node to fix, including choosing the earliest unfixed ReLU or choosing
the ReLU with the largest violation. Bounds on the variables may fix some ReLUs
to be a certain phase, in which case those ReLUs will not need to be split.
The function Violated(S, P ) should reason about whether a property P holds
for the partial activation state S. Reluplex accomplishes this by relaxing each un-
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determined ReLU from z = max(0, zˆ) to z ≥ 0 ∧ z ≥ zˆ. A variety of other
relaxations for a ReLU are possible (Liu et al., 2019). Using this relaxation means
that these undetermined ReLUs can each be written with two linear constraints,
allowing the relaxed feasibility problem to be an LP. Recall that L represents the
indices of ReLU layers, I represents the indices of identity layers, A gives the
set of active nodes in the activation state, N gives the set of inactive nodes for
the activation state, and U gives the set of undetermined nodes for the activation
state. We also assume we have upper and lower bounds on each variable denoted
as Uˆ(i,j) and Lˆ(i,j) for pre-activation variables, and Ui,j and Li,j for post activa-
tion variables for each node (i, j). With all of these variables defined, the relaxed
feasibility problem can now be formulated as
maximize
x,zˆ,z
0
subject to x ∈ X
zK ∈ Y{
zˆi+1 = Wizi + bi, i = 1, . . . ,K − 1
zi = zˆi, i ∈ I
zi,j = zˆi,j , (i, j) ∈ Aˆ
zi,j = 0, (i, j) ∈ Nˆ
zi,j ≥ zi,j (i, j) ∈ U
zi,j ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ U
Lˆi,j ≤ zˆi,j ≤ Uˆi,j
Li,j ≤ zi,j ≤ Ui,j
(17)
Recall that the complement of the output set is applied as a constraint, represent-
ing the search for a counter-example.
Since this problem is a relaxation, if the problem is infeasible then the exact
problem must also be infeasible. If the problem is feasible, then the satisfying
assignment from the LP can be checked to see if it is consistent with the exact
problem. If it is, then we have found a counter-example. If not, then the feasi-
bility of the exact problem remains unknown. These observations can be used to
construct the Violated function.
To extend the Reluplex algorithm to perform optimization, we need to extend
the functionality of the Violated(S, P ) procedure to create a OptimumForRe-
gion(S, P ) procedure. We will convert the feasibility problem used to implement
Violated(S, P ), equation (17) into a linear program which will provide us an
upper bound on the objective. This requires adding an objective to the problem
being solved just like with purely optimization approaches in section 3.3. If we have
an objective function g(x) and assume without loss of generality the objective is
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being maximized, we arrive at the formulation
maximize
x,zˆ,z
g(x)
subject to x ∈ X
zK ∈ Y{
zˆi+1 = Wizi + bi, i = 1, . . . ,K − 1
zi = zˆi, i ∈ I
zi,j = zˆi,j , (i, j) ∈ Aˆ
zi,j = 0, (i, j) ∈ Nˆ
zi,j ≥ zi,j (i, j) ∈ U
zi,j ≥ 0 (i, j) ∈ U
Lˆi,j ≤ zˆi,j ≤ Uˆi,j
Li,j ≤ zi,j ≤ Ui,j
(18)
The objective function, input set, and output set can be used to represent output
optimization problems and minimum input perturbation problems. The resulting
optimal value p∗ from this LP provides an upper bound on the true optimal
value for this activation state since the LP comes from a relaxation of the exact
optimization problem for this region.
In order to implement OptimumForRegion(S, P , optSoFar) we first solve
the LP in equation (18). If the optimal value, representing an upper bound on
the objective, is lower than optSoFar, then status WorseThanOpt is returned.
Otherwise, the procedure checks whether the found upper bound can actually be
achieved — this is done by passing the corresponding input value through the
network, or checking whether all ReLU constraints are met. If it does, it is the
optimum value for the region, and status Optimal with this optimal objective
value and assignment is returned. Otherwise, status Unknown is returned, indi-
cating that the search should continue in sub-regions. The relaxed LP becomes
exact when all activation states are defined, therefore this approach is guaranteed
to find the optimum in a fully defined activation state, i.e. in a leaf node of the bi-
nary search tree representing the activation space. This ensures that the procedure
will return an optimum in every leaf node, ensuring termination of the algorithm.
4.1 Example
The optimization process is illustrated in figure 1. Each node contains the opti-
mum value of the relaxed LP associated with that partial activation state. Gray
shading indicates that the optimum of the relaxed LP satisfies all linear and ReLU
constraints and so is a valid candidate for global optimum. This figure shows that
the algorithm performs two splits and then finds a solution that satisfies both
the linear and nonlinear constraints (the gray shaded node). The maximum value
found is 9. This can then be used to trim the branch to its right, where the best
value found is only 7. The rightmost node is found to be infeasible, completing the
search. The optimal value is 9.
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No ReLUs fixed 20
1 ReLU fixed 17 −∞
2 ReLUs fixed 9 7
Fig. 1: Example search tree with LP objective values
5 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of MarabouOpt on a diverse set of
optimization queries, including safety properties of control systems and robustness
properties of perception models.
5.1 Implementation and Experimental Setup
We extend Marabou (Katz et al., 2019), an open-source neural network verifica-
tion tool implementing the Reluplex algorithm, to support solving optimization
queries, using the method described in section 3.4 and section 4. Marabou inte-
grates the symbolic bound tightening techniques introduced in Wang et al. (2018c)
and a modified version of the progressive bound tightening preprocessing pass in-
troduced in Tjeng et al. (2017). Note that while the tool supports parallelism in
both preprocessing and solving (Wu et al., 2020), the results here do not make use
of any parallelism. Integrating our optimizing extension with the parallel features
of Marabou is a promising avenue for future work.
We refer to the optimizing extension of Marabou as MarabouOpt. Given an
optimization query and a timeout, MarabouOpt returns Infeasible, Timeout, or
the variable assignment for the optimal solution. We compare MIPVerify (Tjeng
et al., 2017) to MarabouOpt as it can solve the same set of benchmarks.
As an additional baseline, we implement a binary search to solve optimization
problems with a series of calls to the Marabou verifier and the approach described
in section 3.1. For output optimization queries, we first perform calls to the verifier
to find an upper bound for the objective, and then begin the binary search. For
minimum adversarial input queries we begin with an upper and lower bound and
can thus immediately start the binary search in the middle of that interval. In
all cases, we continue narrowing the interval until an optimality gap less than
1e − 4 is achieved. Since the minimum adversarial input queries chosen have the
potential to be unsatisfiable (there is no adversarial input in the given region),
the binary search will return that the query is unsatisfiable if it does not find an
adversarial example to within 1× 10−4 of the border of the region. We choose to
start in the middle instead of first checking whether the full region is satisfiable,
as we expected many queries to be satisfiable and for a query that includes the
full input region to be quite expensive. By starting in the middle we potentially
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avoid ever needing to consider substantial portions of the full input region if we
find an adversarial example early enough. This is a design choice for the binary
search which we expect results in different times for satisfiable and unsatisfiable
queries than if we had first checked satisfiability.
In addition to complete methods, we also compare against three approximate
approaches, including Projected GradientDescent (PGD), Limited-memory BFGS
(LBFGS), and the Fast Gradient SignedMethod (FGSM).
5.2 Benchmarks
The benchmark set consists of network-query pairs, with networks from three
different application domains: aircraft collision avoidance (ACAS Xu), aircraft
localization (TinyTaxiNet), and digit recognition (MNIST). Optimization queries
include both output optimization problems and minimum adversarial perturbation
problems.
ACAS Xu Family. The ACAS Xu family of benchmarks, introduced in Katz
et al. (2017), implements a prototype aircraft collision avoidance system — advis-
ing course corrections based on the relative positions of two aircraft. The system
consists of 45 fully-connected feed-forward neural networks, each with 6 hidden
layers and 50 ReLU nodes per layer. Each network uses 5 inputs to describe the
encounter geometry and produces 5 outputs — the predicted cost of following each
action. The system chooses the action with the lowest cost as the advisory. We
consider both output optimization queries and minimum adversarial perturbation
queries on the 45 networks.
For output optimization queries, the objective is maximizing yreal−yadv, where
yreal is the expected output in the given input region, and yadv is an adversarial
output. For minimum adversarial perturbation queries, the objective is to mini-
mize the perturbation on one input dimension that would result in an adversarial
output. The input regions used in the output optimization queries are from prop-
erties 1–4 in Katz et al. (2017), which apply to all 45 networks. The minimum
adversarial perturbation queries use the same input region as property 2 and min-
imize the perturbation on each dimension. In total, this yields 180 (45×4) output
optimization queries and 225 (45× 5) input optimization queries.
TinyTaxiNet. The TinyTaxiNet family of benchmarks consist of perception net-
works that predict the aircraft position on the taxiway relative to the center-line.
The output is used by a controller that adjusts the trajectory to correct the posi-
tion of the aircraft. The input to the network is a gray-scale image compressed to
16x8 pixels, with values ranging between [0,1]. The networks produce two outputs:
the lateral distance to the runway center-line and the heading angle with respect
to the center-line. We evaluated on three network architectures, each consisting of
one convolution layer and 2 feed-forward layers. The networks have a total of 32,
64, and 128 ReLUs, respectively.
We consider the problem of output optimization on these benchmarks. The
task is to maximize the predicted lateral distance to the runway center-line. The
input region is a hyper-cube parametrized by the centroid and the radius. For each
network, we generate 60 such queries, with centroids randomly sampled from the
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training data and the radius sampled evenly from the set {0.04, 0.08, 0.016}.
MNIST. We also evaluated MarabouOpt on four fully-connected feed-forward
networks trained on the MNIST dataset of handwritten digits. Each network has
784 inputs (representing a grey-scale image) with value range [0,1] and 10 outputs
(each representing a digit). We generated 4 models. MNIST1 and MNIST2 consist
of 10 layers each, with 10 and 20 ReLU nodes per layer respectively. MNIST3
and MNIST4 consist of 20 layers each, with 20 and 40 ReLU nodes per layer
respectively.
We consider minimum adversarial perturbation queries on the MNIST net-
works. The task is to minimize the L∞ perturbation on the input image that
results in an adversarial output. We generate 50 such queries for each network, by
randomly choosing the training images and incorrect labels. We set the radius of
the input region to be 0.05, which corresponds to a maximal perturbation of 13
pixel-values. These queries may be infeasible if there is no adversarial input within
the input region.
In summary, the full benchmark set consists of 225 minimum adversarial per-
turbation queries on ACAS Xu networks (ACAS In.), 180 output optimization
queries on the ACAS Xu networks (ACAS Out.), 180 output optimization queries
on the TinyTaxiNets (Taxi Out.), and 200 minimum adversarial perturbation
queries on the MNIST networks (MNIST Out.).
5.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present results of the following experiments:
1. Evaluation of the runtime performance of MarabouOpt and MarabouBin on
the three benchmark sets. We compare against MIPVerify, a state-of-the-art
solver on the same benchmarks.
2. Comparison of the objective values found by approximate methods with the
true optimums found by exact methods.
We run all experiments on a cluster equipped with Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4 cpus
running Ubuntu 16.04. One processor with 8GB RAM was allocated for each job.
5.4 Runtime evalution
We ran MarabouOpt, MarabouBin, and MIPVerify on all benchmarks; each job
is given a 2-hour CPU timeout. MIPVerify tightens the bounds of the input to
each neuron with an MIP-solver and then solves the preprocessed queries using
a Mixed-integer encoding of the problem. Marabou employs a similar preprocess-
ing pass except that the tightening is done on both the input variable and the
output variable of each neuron. The timeout per preprocessing query for both
MarabouOpt and MIPVerify is 1 second, while that for MarabouBin is 0.5 second.
We obtain these values by performing a grid search of this parameter for each
solver on a subset of benchmarks.
The number of solved instances and total runtime of the solved instances are
shown in table 1. For each benchmark, we highlight the solver that solves the most
instances.
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Solver
MNIST In. (200) ACAS In. ( 225) Taxi Out. (180) ACAS Out. (180)
#Solved Time #Solved Time #Solved Time #Solved Time
MIPVerify 61 99127 138 300558 180 3150 90 1169.4
MarabouBin 29 53301 123 504615 120 20237 82 107422
MarabouOpt 14 13209 174 226431 126 6144 97 61864
Table 1: Number of solved instances and runtime in seconds.
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Fig. 2: Runtime comparison of MarabouOpt and MarabouBin.
As shown by table 1, MarabouOpt outperforms MarabouBin on three of the
four benchmark sets, showing that our integrated extension of the Marabou verifier
to support optimization is overall more effective than the black-box approach
using bisection search. A more detailed breakdown of the runtime is shown in
figure 2, which is a scatter plot of the runtime of the two solvers on all benchmarks.
Points on the top and right boundaries are queries solved by only one of the two
solvers. The scatter plot shows that MarabouOpt significantly outperforms the
binary search approach evidenced by the concentration of points below the dashed
diagonal line in figure 2. The scatter plot shows that MarabouBin outperforms
MarabouOpt on a some of the MNIST input queries and ACAS input queries,
which merits further investigation.
On the other hand, MarabouOpt and MIPVerify show strengths on different
benchmark sets. While MIPVerify outperforms MarabouOpt on MNIST and Tiny-
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Fig. 3: Runtime comparison of MarabouOpt and MIPVerify.
TaxiNet benchmarks, MarabouOpt solves more instances of both input and out-
put optimization queries on the ACAS Xu networks. The complementary nature
of the two solvers is further illustrated by figure 3. The cluster on the bottom left
boundary suggests that a subset of output optimization problems on the ACAS
Xu benchmarks can be quickly resolved by MIPVerify while taking non-trivial
time for MarabouOpt. On the other hand, the points on the upper right region
suggest that MarabouOpt is able to solve some of the harder ACAS Xu qeuries
that MIPVerify cannot handle. The horizontal point cloud in the lower part sug-
gests that a number of minimum adversarial perturbation benchmarks on ACAS
Xu networks take Marabou around 900 seconds to solve. This is because many of
those queries are quickly resolved by MarabouOpt after the preprocessing pass.
Figure 4 shows the number of commonly and uniquely solved benchmarks by
the three solvers. There are 86 instances that can be uniquely solved by MIPVerify,
and 36 instances that can be uniquely solved by MarabouOpt. The two solvers
combined can cover over 99% of the solved instances. Interestingly, there are 3
instances that only MarabouBin can solve. Upon closer examination, they are all
minimum adversarial input queries.
In total, 522 out of the 785 benchmarks are solved. MarabouOpt solved 12
infeasible queries, while MIPVerify solved 6. Figures 5 and 6 are two examples of
the minimum adversarial inputs found by MarabouOpt on MNIST1. In particular,
a hardly discernible perturbation (0.001) can result in a misclassification in figure
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Fig. 4: Number of commonly and uniquely solved benchmarks.
Fig. 5: The original image (left) and a
minimum adversarial example (right)
found by MarabouOpt ( = 0.001,
adv. label: 1).
Fig. 6: The original image (left) and a
minimum adversarial example (right)
found by MarabouOpt ( = 0.048,
adv. label: 7).
5, while it requires a perturbation with L∞ norm of at least 0.048 (corresponding to
12 pixel-values) for the network to mistakenly classify the image as a “7” in figure
6, suggesting that the same network can exhibit very different local adversarial
robustness properties in different input regions.
5.5 Objective value evaluation: exact vs. approximate
To investigate the gap between the exact optimum and the bounds that approx-
imate methods find, we run three approximate methods on all output maximiza-
tion queries and compare the obtained lower bounds with the exact values on
commonly solved instances. As shown in figure 7, LBFGS tends to give the tight-
est lower bounds among the approximate methods. However, the gap between the
best lower bound and the true maximum can be significant. LBFGS also tended
to take the most time out of the approximate solvers. It took minutes or even over
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Fig. 7: Exact vs. Approximate methods
an hour on some queries, while PGD and FGSM typically took less than a second
and were more consistent in their runtime.
6 Related Work
In this section, we summarize existing neural verification and neural optimization
methods. We organize the discussion using the categorization of neural verifiers
introduced in Liu et al. (2019). For optimization, we focus on works relevant to the
two specific optimization problems addressed in this paper: output optimization
problems and minimum adversarial input problems (see section 2.3).
Neural Verification Methods. Neural verification methods check properties
about the input-output relationship of a network. Specifically, given an input set
and an output set, a verification method proves that all elements of the input set
are mapped by the network into the output set. Section 2 provides notation for
this problem.
Liu et al. (2017) separate verification algorithms into four categories: reach-
ability, optimization, search with reachability, and search with optimization. In
this work we make particular reference to reachability verifiers ExactReach and
NNV (Xiang et al., 2017; Tran et al., 2020a), optimization verifiers NSVerify and
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MIPVerify (Lomuscio and Maganti, 2017; Tjeng et al., 2017), search with reach-
ability verifiers ReluVal and Neurify (Wang et al., 2018c,a), and search with op-
timization verifiers Reluplex and Venus (Katz et al., 2017, 2019; Botoeva et al.,
2020). We refer the reader to section 2.1 or the survey paper (Liu et al., 2019)
for a more thorough description and discussion. Bunel et al. (2020) also provide
a framework for neural verification in terms of a branch and bound search. Both
frameworks are very useful for conceptualization of how different verification al-
gorithms function and their common high-level structure.
Exact Optimization Methods. There are several existing techniques for solv-
ing general optimization problems on neural networks. These problems are di-
rectly encoded as mixed integer programs (MIP) (Wolsey, 1998; Cheng et al.,
2017; Fischetti and Jo, 2017; Lomuscio and Maganti, 2017) and solved by an MIP
solver such as the open source solver GLPK (Makhorin, 2004) or the highly opti-
mized commercial solver Gurobi (Gurobi Optimization, 2020). MIPVerify (Tjeng
et al., 2017) employs a progressive bound-tightening preprocessing step and ap-
plies an MIP solver to the problem. This preprocessing pass has a significant
impact on computation time, and a similar preprocessing pass is implemented in
MarabouOpt. Another approach treats existing neural verifiers as a black box,
performing a bisection method using multiple verification calls. This method has
been applied in adaptive stress testing of a control network (Julian et al., 2020)
and to find minimally distorted adversarial examples (Carlini et al., 2017). Opti-
mization modulo theory solvers can also handle complex, non-convex optimization
problems (Bjorner et al., 2015; Sebastiani and Trentin, 2015, 2020). However, these
solvers are based on satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) technology and perform
computation over real arithmetic, which has been reported to scale poorly com-
pared to the less precise floating point optimizers (Katz et al., 2017).
Approximate Optimization Methods. There is also a rich body of literature
on approximate techniques for both optimization problems, particularly within the
field focused on adversarial example discovery. Generation of adversarial examples
typically combines a local optimization method with heuristics and applies it to a
neural network. Approximate approaches exchange optimality for computational
efficiency and often focus on minimum perturbation problems (Szegedy et al.,
2013; Carlini and Wagner, 2017). Yuan et al. (2019) offer a taxonomy of these
techniques in their survey. We address the methods relevant for this work. LBFGS
is a quasi-newtonian optimization method that finds an approximate minimum
perturbation adversarial input (Zhu et al., 1997; Szegedy et al., 2013). Fast-Lin
and Fast-Lip, mentioned in section 6, provide a lower bound on the minimum ad-
versarial distortion and count among approximate optimizers because they yield
an approximate minimum on the distortion. FGSM and PGD have been used to
directly generate adversarial examples within a small input region, corresponding
to our output optimization problem, instead of finding minimum perturbation ad-
versarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Madry et al., 2017). LBFGS can be
used in this way as well.
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7 Conclusions
This paper presents general strategies for extending different categories of neu-
ral verifiers to solve global optimization problems. It focuses on two classes of
problems: output optimization and minimum adversarial perturbation problems.
We extended the Marabou neural verifier to create an optimizer MarabouOpt
and compared its runtime performance against the black-box bisection search and
MIPVerify. We observed that on a significant majority of queries MarabouOpt
substantially outperformed a naive bisection based approach, showing the advan-
tages of tight integration that can be achieved with proposed extension strategies.
Comparison of MarabouOpt and MIPVerify shows complementary performance,
indicating underlying methods have both strengths and weaknesses and that ex-
tension of each base method should be explored. Our comparison of the global
optima found by these solvers to local optima from several adversarial attacks,
while often similar, had some marked differences.
Neural optimization problems have a wide variety of applications and merit
deeper investigation. By encouraging the development of optimization techniques,
we hope that more tools will be available to those working to verify safety critical
systems.
Further work is needed to determine which verifiers will work best when ex-
tended to perform optimization tasks. This could consist of extending several more
algorithms and comparing their performance against MarabouOpt and MIPVerify.
Additional work would also lie in incorporating some of the best-practices from
each technique into the others. For example, integrating MIPVerify’s optimization
based preprocessing step (Tjeng et al., 2017) as we did with MarabouOpt may
provide other verifiers with a performance boost as well.
Incomplete solvers could also be used to obtain bounds on the optima for
our optimization problems. For example, Ai2 and its updated version ERAN can
compute an approximate reachable set for each layer (Gehr et al., 2018; Singh
et al., 2018a,b; Balunovic et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2019a,b). Maximizing an output
objective over this approximate reachable set will give us an upper bound on the
true optimum. For optimization based methods these bounds on the objective can
be applied as constraints before solving. For some use cases these bounds may
provide enough information if an exact solution is not needed.
There are several promising directions to improve MarabouOpt. Many of these
involve reducing the depth of tree the algorithm needs to explore. Some strate-
gies include further developing our bound tightening strategies, more intelligently
choosing the node to split on, incorporating input splitting like in Marabou’s Split-
and-Conquer strategy (Katz et al., 2019), and incorporating MIPVerify’s prepro-
cessing step. In Addition, parallelization could be incorporated into the optimizer.
Marabou has been able to use parallelism to great effect (Wu et al., 2020). The
same extensions could be explored with MarabouOpt.
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